Java Components Vulnerabilities - An Experimental Classification Targeted at the OSGi Platform by Parrend, Pierre & Frénot, Stéphane
HAL Id: inria-00157341
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00157341v4
Submitted on 27 Jul 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Java Components Vulnerabilities - An Experimental
Classification Targeted at the OSGi Platform
Pierre Parrend, Stéphane Frénot
To cite this version:
Pierre Parrend, Stéphane Frénot. Java Components Vulnerabilities - An Experimental Classification
Targeted at the OSGi Platform. [Research Report] RR-6231, INRIA. 2007, pp.84. ￿inria-00157341v4￿
in
ria
-0
01
57
34
1,
 v
er
si
on
 4
 -
 2
7 
Ju
l 2
00
7
appor t  
de recherche 
IS
S
N
02
49
-6
39
9
IS
R
N
IN
R
IA
/R
R
--
62
31
--
F
R
+
E
N
G
Thème COM
INSTITUT NATIONAL DE RECHERCHE EN INFORMATIQUE ET EN AUTOMATIQUE
Java Components Vulnerabilities
-
An Experimental Classification
Targeted at the OSGi Platform
Pierre Parrend — Stéphane Frénot
N° 6231
June 2007
Unité de recherche INRIA Rhône-Alpes
655, avenue de l’Europe, 38334 Montbonnot Saint Ismier (France)
Téléphone : +33 4 76 61 52 00 — Télécopie +33 4 76 61 52 52
Java Components Vulnerabilities-An Experimental ClassiationTargeted at the OSGi Platform ∗Pierre Parrend, Stéphane FrénotThème COM  Systèmes ommuniantsProjet ARESRapport de reherhe n° 6231  June 2007  84 pagesAbstrat: The OSGi Platform nds a growing interest in two dierent appliationsdomains: embedded systems, and appliations servers. However, the seurity properties ofthis platform are hardly studied, whih is likely to hinder its use in prodution systems.This is all the more important that the dynami aspet of OSGi-based appliations, thatan be extended at runtime, make them vulnerable to maliious ode injetion.We therefore perform a systemati audit of the OSGi platform so as to build a vul-nerability atalog that intends to referene OSGi Vulnerabilities originating in the CoreSpeiation, and in behaviors related to the use of the Java language. Implementation ofStandard Servies are not onsidered.To support this audit, a Semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern is dened, that enables touniquely haraterize fundamental properties for eah vulnerability, to inlude verbose de-sription in the pattern, to referene known seurity protetions, and to trak the imple-mentation status of the proof-of-onept OSGi Bundles that exploit the vulnerability.Based on the analysis of the atalog, a robust OSGi Platform is built, and reommenda-tions are made to enhane the OSGi Speiations.Key-words: OSGitm Platform, Seurity, Dependability, Java, Hardened Exeution Plat-form, Vulnerability Catalog
∗ This Work is partialy founded by Muse IST Projet n°026442.
Vulnerabilités des Composants Java-Une Classiation ExpérimentaleDans le Cadre de la Plate-forme OSGiRésumé : La plate-forme d'exéution OSGi renontre un intérêt grandissant dans deuxdomaines d'appliations diérents: les systèmes embarqués, et les serveurs d'appliations.Cependant, les propriétés de ette plate-forme relatives à la séurité ne sont que très peuétudiées, e qui peut fortement freiner son adoption dans les systèmes industriels. Cei estd'autant plus ritique que la possibilité d'extension dynamique à l'exéution oerte par laplate-forme OSGi rend elle-i vulnérable à l'injetion de ode maliieux.Nous eetuons un audit de l'environnement d'exéution OSGi, an de réer un ataloguede vulnérabilités. Nous herhons à référener les vulnérabilités ausées par la spéiation`Core', ou bien par la mahine virtuelle Java sous-jaente. Les autres éléments dénis parOSGi, omme les servies standards, ne sont pas onsidérés.An de mener à bien et audit, nous dénissons un Pattern de Vulnérabilité semi-formel,qui permet de dérire les aratéristiques des vulnérabilités de manière unique, de donnerdes informations omplémentaires, de référener les protetions existantes, et d'identier lestatus de l'implémentation des Bundles OSGi de test qui démontrent haque vulnérabilité.A partir de ette analyse, un plate-forme OSGi robuste est onstruite, et des reommandationspour les spéiations OSGi sont données.Mots-lés : Plate-forme OSGitm, Séurité, Java, Plate-forme d'exéution renforée,Catalogue de Vulnérabilités
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8 Parrend & Frénot1 IntrodutionThe OSGi Platform, whih enables multi-appliation management over Java Virtual Ma-hines, is urrently seeing a dramati inrease in its appliation domains. First targeted atembedded systems suh as multimedia automotive devies, it has sine widespread in theworld of appliations, with the Elipse Integrated Development Environment, and then toappliation servers, suh as IBM Websphere 6.1, or reent development with JBoss. Sun isenvisioning to integrate it in the Sun JVM, and several Java Speiation Request (JSR)work groups have been set up on the subjet1.However, target systems are likely to be highly networked ones, and seurity impliationshave so far been mostly overlooked. Atually, the runtime extensibility of appliations that issupported by the OSGi platform open a brand new attak vetor: ode an be installed on they, and no mehanism urrently guarantees that this ode is not maliious. As OSGi-basedsystems move from Open-Soure projets and losed embedded devies toward large-salesystems, this weakness an turn into a major vulnerability, unless seurity impliations arebetter understood. We therefore perform in this study a systemati analysis of vulnerabilitiesthat are implied by OSGi bundles, and propose adequate ounter-measures.Up to now, Two omplementary mehanisms are used to enfore seurity in the ontext ofOSGi-based systems. The rst mehanism is bundle digital signature [OSG05, PF06℄, whihguarantees that only bundles from trusted issuers are installed. This trust requirementfores the issuer to publish only safe bundles, sine he will liable for any inident aused bythe ode he provides. The seond mehanism is based on Java permissions, that enable toswith on or o some attak-prone features of the Java Virtual Mahine. These mehanismsare mostly insuient to guarantee that systems are safe. First, knowing the identity of abundle issuer does not give guarantees related to the quality of its bundles. Seondly, mostimplementations do not have a proper implementation of the digital signature mehanism:they rely on the JVM built-in veriation mehanism, whih is not ompliant with OSGispeiations [PF07℄. And, lastly, Java permissions an not be onsidered as a panaea,sine they are usually not dynami, and have a great ost in term of funtionality, but alsoin term of performane.New methods and new seurity mehanisms therefore need to be dened to providehardened OSGi Platforms. We present in this report our ontribution to this problem,by addressing several requirements. A method for analyzing the seurity properties of theOSGi Platform is dened. It is based on a atalog of vulnerabilities, and an therefore beompleted when further knowledge relative to OSGi Vulnerabilities is gathered. Based onthe analysis of this atalog, OSGi spei vulnerabilities are identied, and a prototype isbuilt to show the seurity mehanisms that an be used. Reommendations for an evolutionof the speiation of the OSGi Core platform are proposed to enable the OSGi Communityto take advantage of this work.This researh report is organized as follows. Works related to vulnerability harateri-zation and analysis are presented in Setion 2. A denition of our Software Vulnerability1http://jp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=277,http://jp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=291
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 9Pattern is given in Setion 3: it haraterized the properties of an OSGi system that needto be listed so as to support vulnerability analysis. The analysis of the vulnerability atalogis then provided, and reommendation for building a hardened OSGi Platform is given inSetion 4.Complementary informations are to be found in the Appendies. In partiular, a pre-sentation of the OSGi Platform is given in Appendix A; the formal expression of the Vul-nerability Pattern we dened is given in Appendix C; the vulnerability atalog in givenin its integrality in Appendix D; and the spei implementations of attaks based on theidentied vulnerabilities are given in Appendix E.
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10 Parrend & Frénot2 Charaterization of Vulnerabilities in Component-basedSystemsThe lassiation of the seurity - and vulnerability - properties of systems is neessary toomprehend their weaknesses and to make them more robust. We present here the eortthat have been done to establish a preise knowledge of what vulnerabilities are, how toanalyse them, and how to take advantage from them to improve the omputing systems.First, the terms that are used to haraterize vulnerabilities are dened. Next, thedislosure mehanisms for software aws are presented. And Vulnerability Patterns thatsupport vulnerability analysis are given.2.1 DenitionsThe lassiation of seurity properties is based on the distintion between attak, vulner-ability, and aw. The related maliious ations an be prevented by the use of seurityprotetions, or ountermeasures. The denitions of these terms follow.Seurity: the onurrent existene of a) availability for authorized users only, b) onden-tiality, and ) integrity [AJB00℄.Attaks: ations that attempt to defeat the expeted seurity status of a system.Software vulnerability: an instane of an error in the speiation, development, or on-guration of software suh that its exeution an violate the seurity poliy [Krs98℄.Software Flaw: a aw is a harateristi of a software system that builds, when put to-gether with other aws, a vulnerability. The more generi term of WIFF (Weaknesses,Idiosynrasies, Faults, Flaws) is also used [MCJ05℄.Seurity Protetion, or Mitigations, or Countermeasures or Avoidane strategies: meh-anisms and tehniques that ontrol the aess of exeuting programs to stored infor-mation [SS73℄ or to other programs.Now that the neessary terms are dened, dislosure mehanisms are presented.2.2 From Databases to Top-Vulnerability ListsVulnerability dislosure aims at providing users and designers informations that enable themto trak the seurity status of their systems. Two main approahes exist: rst, vulnerabili-ties of widespread appliations are published in Referene Vulnerability Information (RVI)Databases so as to entralize this information; seondly, these vulnerabilities are lassiedaording to Top-Vulnerability Lists, that support a omprehensive views of potential weak-nesses.
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 11Referene Vulnerability Information (RVI) Databases Catalogs, Lists and Tax-onomies are the favorite vetor for expressing the vulnerabilities that are identied in soft-ware systems. The approah varies aording to the target of the vulnerability identiationwork. Extensive databases are meant to maintain up to date referenes on known softwarevulnerabilities, so as to fore the system vendor to path the error before hakers an exploitit. Taxonomies are partiularly used in researh works, whih foster to improve the knowl-edge relative to the vulnerabilities. Their goal is to develop tools based on this taxonomies.The drawbak of these systemati approahes - atalog and taxonomies - is that they arenot easy to remember, and are thus of limited usefulness for developers or ode auditor.Several Top Vulnerability Lists have been proposed to solve this problem, and provide thesoftware professionals with onvenient pratial data.The main existing referenes are vulnerability databases. They are also known under thedenomination of Rened Vulnerability Information (RVI) soures. Two main types of RVIexists: the vulnerability mailing lists, and the vulnerability databases.The main mailing lists are the following: Bugtraq, 1993 onwards (see http://msgs.seurepoint.om/bugtraq/), Vulnwath, 2002 onwards (see http://www.vulnwath.org/), Full Dislosure, 2002 onwards (see among others http://selists.org/).The referene vulnerability databases are the following. They are meant to publish andmaintain referene lists of identied vulnerabilities. the CERT (Computer Emergeny Response Team) Database. It is based on the Com-mon Language for Seurity Inidents [HL98℄2. the CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) Database3. the CWE (Common Weaknesses Enumeration) Database. It is bounded with theCWE, and aims at traking weaknesses and aws that have not yet turned out to beexploitable for attakers4. the CIAC (Computer Inident Advisory Capability) Database5. the OSVDB, Open Soure Vulnerability Database6. It is entered at Open SoureProduts.Complementary Rened Vulnerability Informations Soures are the following organiza-tions: SeuriTeam 7, Paket Storm Seurity 8, the Frenh Seurity Inident Response Team9, ISS X-Fore 10, Seunia, and SeurityFous.2http://www.ert.org/3http://ve.mitre.org/4http://we.mitre.org/index.html5http://www.ia.org/ia/index.html6http://osvdb.org/7http://www.seuriteam.om/8http://paketstormseurity.nl/9http://www.frsirt.om/10http://xfore.iss.net/xfore/alertsRR n° 6231
12 Parrend & FrénotThe limitations of the RVIs is that they follow no stable poliy, whih makes omparisonbetween soures and between the item of a given soures diult [Chr06℄.Top-Vulnerability Lists Sine atalogs are not that easy to remember, and therefore toput into pratie, several `Top N' lists have been dened. The motivation for suh lists isthe reurrent drawbaks of other approahes: vulnerability atalogs do not provide a usefuloverview of the identied vulnerabilities [Chr06℄.Therefore, an alternative approah has been developed: to publish lists of prevalentattak ategories. Their goal is to be used as reminder for developer or seurity analysts[MG06℄, and to serve as referene for software produt haraterization, through integrationinto seurity-based ode assessment tools [MCJ05℄. The most important of these vulnera-bility lists are presented.One lassiation of omputer seurity Intrusions is given by Lindqvist [LJ97℄ (see ap-pendix B.1). It ontains external and hardware misuse, and several software misuse ases:bypassing intended ontrol, ative and passive misuse of resoures, preparation for othermisuse ases.The Plover lassiation11 is an example of rationalization of Vulnerability atalogs tosupport analysis. It is based on the MITRE CVE Database, and ontains 300 spei entriesthat reet 1400 vulnerabilities identied in the CVE database. Its goal is to suppress re-dundany from the original database, so as to enable sienti analysis, e.g. using statistialapproahes [Chr05℄.The Nineteen Deadly Sins of software systems are dened by Mihael Howard, fromMirosoft [HLV05℄ (see appendix B.3). They desribe the most ommon vulnerabilities thatare to be found in enterprise information systems. They onern Web based systems, as wellas the arhiteture of the information systems and the tehnologies involved.The Open Web Appliation Seurity Projet (OWASP) maintains a TOP 10 of WebAppliations vulnerabilities12 (see the appendix B.4). It onerns input validation, datastorage, as well as onguration and error management. Another onsortium for Web Ap-pliation seurity enforement, the WASC (Web Appliation Seurity Consortium), providesits own threat lassiation13.)A onvenient vulnerability list is provided by Gary MGraw, through the Seven King-doms of software vulnerabilities [MG06℄ [TCM05℄. The number 7 is hosen to be easilyremembered, and eah entry is ompleted with Phyla i.e. preise example of the broaderategories that are dened by the Kingdoms. The kingdoms are the following: Input Valida-tion and representation, API abuse, Seurity Features, Time and state, error handling, odequality, enapsulation + environment (see the appendix B.5). This lassiation is targetedat enterprise information systems.The publiation of newly disovered vulnerabilities and of Top-Lists helps the prati-tioner stay informed of the atual seurity risks of the system they use, but they provide11http://ve.mitre.org/dos/plover/12http://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Top_Ten_Projet13http://www.webappse.org/projets/threat/
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 13little support for systemati analysis. Vulnerability Patterns must be dened to formalizevulnerability informations.2.3 Vulnerability PatternsThe desriptive spirit of Design Pattern [Ale77℄, [GHJV94℄, [MM97℄, is well suited for ap-pliation in the seurity elds, where the question of organization and exploitation of theknowledge is entral to the protetion of systems - and not straightforward, if one judgesfrom the various approahes that are used. Two types of patterns are dened in the seuritydomain: Attak Patterns, and Vulnerability Patterns.Attak Patterns represent potential attaks against a system. They model the preon-ditions, proess and postonditions of the attak. They an be ombined with attak trees,so as to automate the identiation of attaks that are atually build from simpler atomiattaks [MEL01℄. An extensive presentation of the appliation of attak pattern is given inthe book by Markus Shumaher [Sh03℄. The use of Attak Patterns together with withsoftware arhiteture desription to identify vulnerabilities is desribed by Gegik [GW05℄.The limitation of this approah is that the attaks must be modelized, but the system mustalso be, whih makes this approah impratial, and often not realisti based on the atualknowledge that is available on systems.The Vulnerability Patterns are used in the atalog of vulnerabilities. They often ontaina limited number of information that are meant to identify the vulnerability, but also to notmake it easily reprodueable without a reasonable amount of eort, to prevent lazy hakersto exploit the vulnerability databases as a soure of ready-to-exploit attak referenes.We list here the most wide-spread Vulnerability Patterns, along with the attribute theyontain: Roky Hekman pattern14: Name, type, subtype, AKA, desription, more information; CERT (Computer Emergeny Response Team) pattern: name, date, soure, systemsaeted, overview, desription, qualitative impat, solution, referenes; CVE15 (Common Vulnerability and Exposures) pattern: name, desription, status,referene(s); CIAC16 (US Department of Energy) pattern: identier, name, problem desription,platform, damage, solution, vulnerability assessment, referenes.These Vulnerability Patterns are quite simple ones. They have an informative goal, butdo not intend as other patterns do at supporting the reprodution of the vulnerability witha minimum of eort. This approah makes sense relative to their use ontext - making usersand administrators aware of the existene of the aws - but are not suient to supportdetailed analysis of the related vulnerabilities.14http://www.rokyh.net/15http://ve.mitre.org/16http://www.ia.org/ia/index.html
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14 Parrend & FrénotSo as to support the automation of the seurity proess, and to make vulnerabilityanalysis possible, it is neessary to put onstraints on the Vulnerability Patterns. This isperformed through the denition of taxonomies, whih provide a ne grain desription ofthe properties of eah vulnerability.Eah taxonomy should verify the properties of a valid taxonomy, as dened by [Krs98℄and [HL98℄. These properties are the following: objetivity, determinism, repeatability,speiity (disjuntion), observability.The seminal work on vulnerability taxonomy has been performed by Abbott [ACD+75℄and Bisbey [BH78℄. The aws are lassied by type of error (suh as inomplete Parametervalidation). This approah turns out not to support deterministi deisions, sine one awan often be lassied in several ategories aording to the ontext. To solve this prob-lem, Landwehr [LBMC94℄ denes three fundamental types of taxonomies for vulnerabilities:lassiation by genesis of the vulnerability, by time of introdution, and by loation (orsoure).Moreover, vulnerabilities should be onsidered aording to spei onstraints or as-sumptions, sine there existene most of the time depends on the properties of the envi-ronment [Krs98℄. This assumptions make it neessary to rely on a well dened systemmodel. For generi omputing systems, suh a model is proposed by the Proess/ObjetModel [BAT06℄. This requirement makes it impossible for generi purpose databases to relyon spei taxonomies. For instane, the Common Vulnerability Enumeration [BCHM99℄projet has given up the use of taxonomies. An expliit system model must thus be availableto support vulnerability taxonomies, and therefore the possibility of seurity automation oranalysis.Extensive disussions of vulnerability taxonomies an be found in [Krs98℄, [SH05℄, [WKP05℄.The CWE (Common Weaknesses Enumeration) Projet maintains a web page with addi-tional referenes, and a graphial representation of eah taxonomy17.In this setion, fundamental onepts of vulnerability analysis have been introdued:denitions have been given to provide a rm basis to work on, and the existing works inthe domain of vulnerability analysis have been presented. This work onerns Vulnerabilityproperties, whih are often presented under the form of a taxonomy, and VulnerabilityPatterns, whih gather the information onerning several properties in a formalized way.Existing Properties and Patterns are not suient to desribe the vulnerabilities ofan OSGi Platform, for several reason: rst, they do not take expliitly into aount thepresene of a virtual mahine; seondly, they are usually targeted at monolithi systems,whereas OSGi provides a high degree of modularity through the bundles and the dependenyresolution. We therefore rst need to dene the properties of interest for an OSGi-basedSystem, as well as a suitable Pattern, before the atual vulnerabilities of the platform anbe analyzed.17http://we.mitre.org/about/soures.html INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 153 The Semi-formal Software Vulnerability PatternThe goal of this study is to identify and to haraterize the vulnerabilities of the OSGiplatform, whih is introdued in the Appendix A. This haraterization is to be done witha set of spei properties, and organized in a semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern. Existingreferenes are not suient to desribe the vulnerabilities of the OSGi Platform: neithervirtualization nor omponentization, that are provided in the ontext of OSGi, are takeninto aount. Moreover, we want our Vulnerability Pattern to provide us with enoughinformation to path them or build suitable seurity mehanism, whih is not the ase inthe literature.The properties of interested that are traked are taken from existing software seuritytaxonomies. We add a new entry, the `Consequene Desription', that aims at evaluatingthe seriousness of the vulnerability. The Pattern is made up of four parts: a Referene, for rapid onsultation, a Desription part, for additional and potentially more verbose information, an Implementation part, to identify the test onditions of the vulnerability, a Protetion part, beause the objetive of identifying the vulnerability is to be ableto path them.Our experimental proess is the following. First, known aws that an aet Java ode[Blo01, BG05℄ have been identied, and their impat on an OSGi Platform has been tested.Seondly, potentially dangerous mehanisms, suh as native ode exeution, have been se-leted from related projets. The third soure of information in our quest for vulnerabilitiesof OSGi bundles is the speiations of the elements that make up an OSGi platform: theJava Virtual Mahine, and the OSGi platform itself. Several Java API let the ode aessto the Virtual Mahine itself (e.g. the System or Runtime API), or are known to ausethe exeution hang (Threads). The behavior of the OSGi platform in the presene of mal-formed or maliious bundles is not speied. We therefore review the various entities thatmake up this exeution environment: the format of the bundle meta-data (Manifest File),the registration of servies, the bundle management and fragment funtionalities. For eahpotential vulnerability, we implemented a maliious bundle. This makes possible to validatethe hypothesis, and to identify the onditions for eah attak. When protetions againstthese attaks exist, they are validated through experiment. The attak bundles are testedin the four main Open Soure implementations of OSGi, Felix, Knopersh, and Equinox,and Conierge.We fous on the behavior of the ore of the onsidered exeution environment, whihomprises the JVM and the OSGi platform. We therefore do not onsider the manage-ment tools for Java systems, suh as JMX, or JVM TI. JMX enables to manage a JVMthough ode exeuted inside it. JVM TI is a C library that makes full ontrol over theJVM possible through a third party program, whih an then aess the available threads,provides an extensive debugging of the platform, and ontrol the JVM state. Seondly,the OSGi bundles ommuniate through servies they publish inside the framework. A-ording to the type of data they handle, these servies an be subjet to spei vul-RR n° 6231
16 Parrend & Frénotnerabilities. A list of Servie-Level vulnerabilities is given by the Findbugs referene list(http://ndbugs.soureforge.net/bugDesriptions.html, `Maliious Code Vulnerability' at-egory). Lastly, the OSGi speiation denes a bunh of standard servies (HTTP, devie,servie wiring, UPnP servies, et.). We do not onsider these servies either.A Vulnerability Pattern is dened to normalize the information gathered relative to eahvulnerability (see setion 3.1). The taxonomies for eah properties of interest are given andexplained in setion 3.2. An example is given in setion 3.3 to highlight the informationprovided by the Vulnerability Pattern.3.1 The Struture of the Semi-formal Vulnerability PatternThe harateristis of interest to desribe the vulnerabilities of a software system need to begathered in a oherent set that ontains all the informations that are useful to understand andprevent these vulnerabilities. We therefore dene a `Semi-formal Vulnerability Pattern' thatis similar to the `Attak Patterns' [MEL01℄. On the opposite of this latter, the VulnerabilityPattern is entered around the identied vulnerability, so as to make their orretion easy.Existing vulnerability patterns, whih are presented in the setion 2, an not be reused as-is,sine they provide not enough details for our purpose.The Vulnerability Pattern is ompound of following informations. Its formal expressionis given in the Apendix C.Vulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: The desriptive name of the vulnerability Identier: a unique identier for eah vulnerability. In our atalog, the identier isbuilt out of the atalog identier, the abbreviation of the soure entity, and the numberID of the vulnerability in the atalog for the related soure entity. Origin: The bibliographi referene of the vulnerability. Loation of Exploit Code: Where the ode that performs the attak is loated inthe maliious Bundle (see Figure 1). Soure: the entity in the exeution platform that is the soure of the vulnerability,along with the exat aw or funtionality ausing it. Target: the target of the attak that an be performed through the vulnerability, i.e.the vitim of the attak (see gure 3). Consequene Type: the type of onsequene of an attak exploiting this vulnerability(see gure 4). Time of Introdution: the Life Cyle phase where the vulnerability is introdued.Corretive measures an be taken at this time. Seurity measures an be taken insubsequent phases so as to prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability (see gure 5). Time of Exploit: the life-yle phase where the vulnerability an be exploited (seegure 6). This is the last phase where seurity measures an be undertaken.
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 17Vulnerability Desription Desription: a desription of the attak Preonditions: properties if the systems that must be true so as to make the ex-ploitation of the vulnerability possible. Attak Proess: desription of the proess of exploitation of the vulnerability. Consequene Desription: more information relative to the onsequenes of anattak using this vulnerability. See also: other vulnerabilities based on similar attak soures.Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: the referene of the implementation ode (i.e. the name of themaliious OSGi bundle.) Conerned OSGi Prole: the OSGi prole(s) where this vulnerability exists. Date: the date of the reation of the Vulnerability Pattern (for referene) Test Coverage: the perentage of the known implementations of the vulnerabilitythat have been implemented in a test bundle. The identied implementations for themain attaks are given in the Appendix E. Tested on: the OSGi Platform Implementations for whih this vulnerability havebeen tested.Protetion Existing mehanisms: available protetions to prevent this vulnerability from beingexploited. Life-yle enforement point: the life-yle phase where the protetion mehanismsmust be enfored. Potential mehanisms: protetions that ould be developed so as to prevent thisvulnerability from being exploited. Attak Prevention: the measures that an be taken to prevent an attak based onthis vulnerability to be fullled, even if it is launhed. Reation: the orretion ation that an be taken to reover from a suessful attak.3.2 Vulnerability Taxonomies for OSGi-based SystemsBefore analyzing eah vulnerability, it is neessary to identify the properties of interestthat need to be haraterized. Moreover, the potential values for eah property should beidentied, and build a properly dened taxonomy. Following aspets need to be onsidered:the referene of the attak bundle implementation that takes advantage of the vulnerability,the life-yle harateristis of the vulnerability, so as to know when the vulnerability isintrodued, and when it is exploited, and the existing and potential seurity mehanisms.
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18 Parrend & FrénotThe properties we seleted to be inluded in the vulnerability pattern are thus the fol-lowing: the referene of the vulnerability pattern (to identify the ode, and the ondition ofthe experiments), the loation of the maliious ode, the soure of the aw(s) in the system (and the spei aw(s) and/or the dangerousfuntionality(ies)), the target of attaks based on the vulnerability, the onsequenes of the related attak, and the time of introdution of the vulnerability, the time of exploitation of the vulnerability, the exiting protetions against this attak, the potential protetions against this attak.The goal of these properties is to make the information explanatory, preditive [Krs98℄,but also useful [WKP05℄. Explanatory, beause the vulnerability should be intuitively un-derstood by the persons who onsult the vulnerability atalog we propose, even with littleprevious knowledge of the OSGi Platform. Preditive, beause the potential values of eahharateristi should over the whole eld of possible options, or to explain why some are notonerned. Useful, beause the objetive of a vulnerability atalog is to highlight the seu-rity requirements of the platform under study. The onlusions of the analysis is presentedin the setion 4.For eah property, a taxonomy is dened, that ontains the values this property an take.Two approahes are used to dene this taxonomy. It is either dened a priori, i.e. before theatalog is ompleted, or a posteriori, with data that are identied during the experiments.We now present the taxonomy for eah of the properties of interest.The rst two properties of interest are the Loation of the maliious ode and the soureof the vulnerability. The loation onerns the plae in the attak bundle where the attak`payload' is loated. The soure indiates whih entity in the exeution environment isresponsible for the vulnerability, i.e. for the system behavior that opens the door to theattak.Figure 1 shows the potential loations of maliious ode inside a malevolent bundle. Themaliious ode an be loated in the arhive struture (suh as arhive oversize, or a de-ompression bomb), in the manifest (suh as dupliate imports, whih make the installationabord), or in the bundle Ativator (is this latter is hanging). It an also be loated in theappliative ode of the bundle, being native ode, Java ode, the Java APIs, or the OSGiAPI. The maliious ode an also be loated in fragment, whih are spei bundle types.The atual soures of vulnerabilities math the dierent Layers that are dened by theOSGi Speiation, along with the Bundle Repository lient whih enables installation fromremote bundles, and various ode properties suh as Servies, the JVM APIs, or the algo-rithmi properties of the programs. They are shown in Figure 2.Figure 3 shows the potential targets of attaks against an OSGi Platform. These targetsan be either the whole platform, or spei OSGi Elements. Attaks against the wholeINRIA
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Figure 1: Potential Loations of maliious Code in a Bundle
Figure 2: Vulnerability Soures in an OSGi-based SystemPlatform an for instane result in omplete unavailability if this latter. The vitim OSGiElements an be the Platform Management Utility, whih makes it possible for the user toontrol the life-yle of bundles (the ativator an hang), the bundle itself (whih an bestarted or stopped), Servies (whih an suer from yles) or pakages (for instane, statidata that is by default not aessible ould be modied through Bundle Fragments).Figure 4 shows the potential onsequenes of an attak against an OSGi Platform. Threetypes of onsequenes are identied: Unavailability, Performane Breakdown, and UndueAess. Unavailability an be ause by stopping the platform; Performane Breakdown anbe the result of an innite loop; and Undue Aess an be performed through Fragments orthrough Reetion over Servies.Figure 5 shows the atual introdution time of the vulnerabilities. The introdution timean be as early as the design and implementation of the platform (when the aw originates inthe platform), or be the development time, the generation of the Meta-data of the bundles,the digital signature of the bundle, the installation, or even the publiation and resolutionof servies.
RR n° 6231
20 Parrend & Frénot
Figure 3: Potential Targets of Attaks against an OSGi Platform
Figure 4: Consequenes of the Vulnerabilities of the OSGi Platform
Figure 5: Introdution Time for the identied awsThe taxonomy for Time of Exploit of the vulnerability is represented in gure 6. Thistime of exploit onerns neessarily the Life-Cyle steps inside the exeution platform. Theyan therefore be: the download, installation, Bundle start (if the vulnerability is presentin the bundle ativator) or exeution time (either through servie all, or through use ofexported pakages).The existing protetions against attaks based on the identied vulnerability are thefollowing: only runtime exeution permissions, either at the JVM level or at the OSGiPlatform level, are urrently available to protet an OSGi Platform from hakers. We
INRIA
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Figure 6: Exploit Time for the identied Flawspropose our own implementation of the OSGi Bundle Digital Signature validation proess,whih is part of the OSGi Seurity Layer. Java Permissions, OSGi Permissions (in partiular AdminPermission), SFelix implementation of the Bundle Digital Signature Validation.The properties of interest that haraterize a vulnerability have been presented. Nextparagraph gives the full Vulnerability Pattern that is based on these properties, and adaptedfor better omprehension.3.3 A Vulnerability Example: `Management Utility Freezing - In-nite Loop'So as to highlight the role of the dened Vulnerability Pattern, we now present an exampleof vulnerability; the `Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop' vulnerability. The wholevulnerability atalog is given in the Appendix D. This vulnerability onsists in the preseneof an innite Loop in the ativator of a given Bundle, whih auses the platform managementtool (often an OSGi shell) to freeze. The presene of innite loops as a vulnerability is givenby Blooh is `Java Puzzlers - Traps, Pitfalls and Corner Cases', puzzlers 26 to 33 [BG05℄.The mathing Pattern is rst given, and then explained.The Vulnerability PatternVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop Extends: Innite Loop in Method Call Identier: Mb.osgi.4 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Ativator Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No safe Bundle Start)RR n° 6231
22 Parrend & Frénot Target: OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown; Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: Bundle StartVulnerability Desription Desription: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator Preonditions: - Attak Proess: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator Consequene Desription: Blok the OSGi Management entity (the felix, equinoxor knopersh shell; when launhed in the KF graphial interfae, the shell remainavailable but the GUI is frozen). Beause of the innite loop, most CPU resoure isonsumed See Also: CPU Load Injetion, Innite Loop in Method Call, Stand Alone InniteLoop, Hanging ThreadProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -CPU ; OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess (launh the bundle a-tivator in a separate thread to prevent startup hanging) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.inniteloopinmethodall-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-24 Test Coverage: 10% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge Known Robust Platforms: SFelixDetails of the Vulnerability Pattern The `Management Utility Freezing - InniteLoop' is referened under the identier `mb.osgi.4', whih means `maliious bundle ata-log - originates in the OSGi Platform itself - number 4. This vulnerability is an extensionof the `Innite Loop in Method Call' one. It has been identied in the frame of the researhprojet `Maliious Bundles' of the INRIA Ares Team..The loation of the maliious ode that performs the attak is the Bundle Ativator.Its soure is the Life-Cyle Layer of the OSGi Platform, whih is not robust against suh aINRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 23vulnerability. Its target is the Platform Management Utility, whih an be either the OSGishell or a graphial interfae suh as the Knopersh GUI. This vulnerability has a two-foldonsequene: the method does not return, so that the aller also freezes; and the inniteloop onsumes most of the available CPU, whih auses the existing servies to suer froma serious performane breakdown.This vulnerability is introdued during development, and exploited at bundle start time.Related Vulnerability Patterns are `Management Utility Freezing - Hanging Thread', thatalso targets the Management Utility, `Innite Loop in Method Call', `CPU Load Injetion',`Stand-alone Innite Loop' that have the same onsequene of performane breakdown, andthe `Hanging Thread', that also freezes the alling thread.No spei protetion urrently exists. Two potential solutions have been identied. Therst onsists in launhing every Bundle Ativator in a new Thread, so as not to blok thealler if the ativator hangs. The seond solution would enable to prevent invalid algorithmsto be exeuted: stati ode analysis tehniques suh as Proof Carrying Code or similarapproahes [Ne97℄ an provide formal proves of ode wellformedness.Its referene implementation is available in the OSGi bundle named `fr.inria.ares.innite-loopinmethodall-0.1.jar', referened the 2006-08-24. The test overage is 10 %, sine tentypes of innite loops have been identied (see the appendix E), and only one has beenimplemented. The test bundle have been tested on the following implementations of theOSGi platform: Felix, Equinox, Knopersh, and Conierge. The only robust Platform isour SFelix Platform, whih is a prototype meant to enhane to urrent Felix implementation.This example highlights the informations that an be found in eah Vulnerability Pat-terns. The information related to the other vulnerabilities is given under the form of pat-terns, to provide a quik overview of the harateristis, and to make analysis possible. Theatalog of the vulnerability patterns is presented in the setion D. The setion 4 presentsthe analysis of this atalog, and the seurity requirements an an be dedued from it.
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24 Parrend & Frénot4 Requirements for seure OSGi SystemsThe analysis of the Vulnerability Patterns we presented in the atalog provides guidelinesfor programming seure OSGi-based systems. The objetive here is two fold. First, theweaknesses of the OSGi Platform are to be identied, so as to provide a framework forthe evolution of its speiation. Seondly, these weaknesses are to be made available in adeveloper-ompliant way, so that programmers an refer to them to verify that their systemdo not open the way to known attaks: the Seven Deadly Sins of the OSGi R4 Platform aretherefore dened.These guidelines are - o ourse - based on the atalog at the moment of its publiation,and an therefore evolve in the future, when new vulnerabilities will be disovered, or whennew part of OSGi systems will be onsidered. Atually, the management tools suh asJVMTI, and the OSGi standard servies are not onsidered, and an be the soure for newvulnerabilities.This setion is organized as follows. Subsetion 4.1 presents the analysis of the atalogthrough statistis related to the signiant properties of the vulnerabilities. Subsetion 4.2presents the Seurity Requirements for a hardened OSGi Platform. Lastly, Subsetion 4.3gives a series of reommendation for the OSGi Speiation, in order to make the platformmore robust.4.1 Catalog AnalysisThe analysis of the identied Vulnerability Patterns provides quantitative data relative tothese vulnerabilities. This subsetion provides a summary of the signiant properties thatharaterize a vulnerability in an OSGi Exeution Environment. We use the term OSGiExeution Environment to desribe an exeution platform running OSGi on top of aJVM. This denomination highlights the fat that not all vulnerabilities are bound to theOSGi speiation itself, but an also originate in other parts of the system.First, quantitative results relative to the vulnerability soures, funtions, aws, as wellas the identied attak targets are given. Next, a summary of the vulnerabilities for eahtested OSGi Platform implementation is presented.Figure 7 shows the soure entity of the identied vulnerabilities. The most importantsoure is the Java API, whih auses the bigger part of the vulnerabilities. Next, theAppliation Code properties, the OSGi Life-Cyle Layer and the OSGi Module Layer alsogenerate an important number of vulnerabilities. Next omes the Java Runtime API, whihis partiularly sensitive, and the OSGi Servie Layer. The Operating System and the BundleRepository Client must also be onsidered as potential soure of vulnerabilities, even thoughtheir impat is more marginal.Figure 8 shows the ardinality of the identied dangerous funtions. First ome theOSGi Bundle Faility, and the Java APIs Reetion, ClassLoader, and Thread. Next, thebundle management, the Java File API and the opportunity of exeuting native ode openthe way to abuses. Several other funtions prove to be dangerous: the Runtime.halt() and
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Figure 7: Entities that are Soure of the vulnerabilitiesthe System.exit() methods, the lak of ontrol on method parameters, and the kill utility atthe OS level whih an be used to shut the platform down.
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Figure 8: Funtions that prove to be dangerous in the ontext of an OSGi Platform
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26 Parrend & FrénotFigure 9 shows the ardinality of the aws of a Java-based exeution environment withthe OSGi Platform. The most important aw is the lak of algorithm safety in the Javalanguage. Next ome several properties of the OSGi platforms, suh as the lak of safe-defaultbundle meta-data handling during the dependeny resolution phase, the lak of ontrol onthe servie registration proess, and the lak of robustness of the bundle start mehanism,whih heavily relies on the validity of the bundle ativators. Several other puntual awshave been identied: data of uninstalled bundles is often kept on the disk spae, being notaessible, no dependeny ontrol is performed at the servie level, the proess of DigitalSignature validation is sometimes not ompliant with the OSGi R4 Speiations, and thebundle arhive is never heked for size or validity, whih provides no protetion againstdeompression bombs or large les, in partiular in resoure-onstraint environments.
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Figure 9: Flaws in an OSGi Exeution EnvironmentFigure 10 shows the target of attaks against an OSGi exeution environment. Theentity that is the rst target of the identied attaks is the platform. This means that mostof the identied attak an easily prevent all servies on the platform the be exeuted ina satisfatorily manner. OSGi spei elements, suh as pakages, Bundles or servies areother frequent targets. Lastly, the Platform Management Utility an also be targeted, whihwould not prevent the platform to provide existing servies, but would prevent any evolutionof these servies - as well as the removal of the maliious bundle.The table 1 shows a summary of the properties of the OSGi Platform implementa-tions under study. The onsidered platforms are the main Open Soure Projets: Felix18,18http://wiki.apahe.org/FELIX/index.html INRIA
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Figure 10: Targets of Attaks against an OSGi Exeution environmentKnopersh19, Elipse Equinox20, and Conierge21. For omparison, we also provide thedata related to SFelix, whih is the Hardened OSGi Platform we develop. It is based on theFelix Platform 0.8.0.Most Open Soure OSGi Platforms are very fragile regarding the set of vulnerabilitywe identied. Equinox proves to have slightly better results than the other ones. SFelixurrently does not intend to provide protetions against all the identied vulnerabilities,but only to provide a rst enhanement of urrent implementations.The result of our analysis have been presented for the properties that haraterize vulner-abilities of an OSGi Platform: Loation of the maliious payload in Bundles, VulnerabilitySoure, Flaws and dangerous Funtions, as well as the identied Attak Targets. It is nowpossible to identify the requirement for a Hardened OSGi Platform.4.2 Requirements for a Hardened OSGi PlatformThe requirement for a Hardened OSGi Platform an be dedued from the atual and poten-tial seurity mehanisms. The objetive is to highlight the seurity mehanisms that need tobe better exploited (for the existing ones), and the ones that need to be developed (for thepotential ones). Priorities an be set aording to the type of target and onsequenes of the19http://www.knopersh.org/20http://www.elipse.org/equinox/21http://onierge.soureforge.net/
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28 Parrend & FrénotVulnerability Felix Knopersh Equinox Conierge SFelix Any withJava Per-missionsExponential Objet Creation V V V V V -Exessive Size of Manifest File V V R V R -Aess Proteted Pakage throughsplit Pakages V V V - V RFreezing Numerous Servie Regis-tration - - - V - -Big File Creator V V V V V RManagement Utility Freezing -Thread Hanging V V V V R -Erroneous values of Manifest at-tributes V V V V V -Invalid Digital Signature Valida-tion V - - - R -Cyle Between Servies V V V V V -Hanging Thread V V V V V -Management Utility Freezing - In-nite Loop V V V V R -Fragment Substitution V V V - V RNumerous Servie Registration V V V V R -Sleeping Bundle V V V V V -Code Observer V V V - V RReursive Thread Creation V V V V V -Dupliate Pakage Import V V R R R -Memory Load Injetion V V V V V -Innite Loop in Method Call V V V V V -Runtime.halt V V V V V RCPU Load Injetion V V V V V RSystem.exit V V V V V RRuntime.exe.kill V V V V V RComponent Data Modier V V V V V RStand Alone Innite Loop V V V V V -Exeute Hidden Classes V V V - V RPirat Bundle Manager V V V V V RBig Component Installer - - - - R -Launh a Hidden Bundle V V V V V RZombie Data V R R V R -Deompression Bomb - - - - - -Hidden Method Launher V V V V V RV: Platform is Vulnerable; R: Platform is Robust; - : not relevantTable 1: Vulnerabilities for the main Open Soure OSGi Platforms INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 29attaks: it is in any ase worth preventing an attak that makes the whole platform unavail-able, but it may be less important to prevent attaks that provoke only the unavailabilityof the maliious bundle itself.Figure 11 shows the ardinality of the atual protetion mehanisms. Most of the vul-nerabilities an be prevented by Java Permissions. However, an important number of themurrently have no assoiated protetions. The OSGi Admin Permission and the SFelix im-plementation of the OSGi Seurity Layer (Digital Signature Validation part) aount eahfor one vulnerability.
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Figure 11: Atual Protetion MehanismsThe Figure 12 shows the potential protetions identied to protet an OSGi Platformagainst the onsidered attaks. This potential protetions are o ourse only set as hypothe-ses: as long as no implementation is available, it is not possible to assert that no speialase or hard-to-trak false positives and negatives dot not our if the propose tehniqueis used. The most promising approah seems to be stati ode analysis, that would helptrak both dangerous alls without heavyweight permissions and unsafe algorithms. TheOSGi Platform itself would take benet of several minor modiations: better handling ofill-formed meta-data, safe startup proess for bundles, better ontrol of servie publiation.Some of these mehanisms have been experiened in the SFelix Platform, and prove to beeasy to implement. Also, resoure ontrol and isolation mehanisms (CPU, Memory, diskspae) would make the support of multi-proesses safer.The potential protetion mehanism represent the element that are worth an impor-tant development eort. However, they do not show the relative priority of the seuritymehanisms. Urgent seurity mehanisms are the ones that prevent attaks with seriousonsequenes - for instane platform unavailability - to be performed, or the ones that are
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Figure 12: Cardinality for eah potential Seurity Mehanisms for the OSGi platformrequired to make the use of existing mehanisms eient and onvenient for developers.Consequently, the priority is to be set on following protetion mehanisms: Protetion of Attaks targeted at the whole Platform (see Figure 10), and that impairthe availability or the performane of all exeuted bundles simultaneously, Protetion against silent attaks: lassial aess ontrol mehanisms are requiredinside the OSGi Platform, to support mutually untrustful bundles, tools are required to take advantages of existing mehanisms: for instane, Permissionare supported, but urrently extremely unonvenient to set and manage.We presented the requirement for developing a Hardened OSGi Platform by identifyingthe best promising potential seurity mehanisms as well as the most urgent tools for pre-venting serious attaks, or taking advantage of existing protetions. However, developersrequire ready-to-use guidelines to take advantage of the knowledge we gathered in thesestudy: in the absene of available tools, they have to take are by themselves that the odethey produe is safe from the known vulnerabilities.4.3 Reommendations for a Hardened Exeution EnvironmentHardening the Speiations of the OSGi Platform Based on the identied vulner-ability of the OSGi Platform, we propose following reommendation for an enhaned OSGiINRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 31Platform. These reommendation do not pretend to solve every identied problems, butintend to make the ommunity aware of the easy hanges that an be made to the OSGiSpeiation so as to prevent avoidable aws.These reommendations are validated by the Platform SFelix version 0.2, whih is arobust extension to the Felix 0.8.0 implementation of the OSGi Platform.Following improvement to the OSGi Release 4 Speiation should be made: Bundle Installation Proess: a maximum storage size for bundle arhives is set.Alternatively, a maximum storage size for all data stored on the loal disk is set(Bundle Arhives and les reated by the bundles); OSGi R4 par. 4.3.3. Bundle Uninstallation Proess: remove the data on the loal bundle lesystemwhen a bundle is uninstalled (and not when the platform is stopped); OSGi R4 par.4.3.8. Bundle Signature Validation Proess: the digital signature must be heked atinstalled time. It must not rely on the Java built-in validation mehanism, sine thislatter is not ompliant with the OSGi R4 Speiations [PF07℄; OSGi R4, Paragraph2.3. Bundle Dependeny Resolution Proess: do not rejet dupliate imports. justignore them; OSGi R4 par. 3.5.4. Bundle Start Proess: launh the Bundle Ativator in a separate thread; OSGi R4par. 4.3.5. OSGi Servie Registration: set a Platform Property that expliitly limits thenumber of registered servies (default ould be 50); OSGi R4 par. 5.2.3. Bundle Download: when a bundle download faility is available, the total size of thebundles to installed should be heked immediately after the dependeny resolutionproess. The bundles should be installed only if the required storage is available.To support this modiations of the OSGi R4 speiations, following hanges have beenapplied to the API: In the Class BundleContext, a method `getAvailableStorage()' is dened, A property `osgi.storage.max' is dened, that is set in the property onguration leof the OSGi framework. In the lass org.osgi.servie.obr.Resoure, a method `getSize()' is dened. This methodrelies on the `size' entry of the bundle meta-data representation (usually a XML le).In addition to these simple enhanement, more researh work is required in order todene proper solution to the identied vulnerabilities. The most important ones are thefollowing: Stati Code Analysis for Java, Convenient Permission Management for Java and OSGi,
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32 Parrend & Frénot Resoure isolation in omponent systems, Mandatory Servie Management.Through this study, we identied both tehnial requirements for enhanement of theOSGi R4 Speiations, and neessary researh work that is neessary to protet the OSGiPlatform.Hardening the Speiations of the Java Virtual Mahine Some safety require-ments have also been identied at the Virtual Mahine Level.The aws that have been identied in the Sun Java Virtual Mahine version 1.6 are thefollowing: the Java Permission `exitVM' appears not to be eetive, the presene of a manifest with a huge size in a loaded Jar le introdues a dramatislowdown of the JVM when the arhive Manifest is extrated. Our implementationshows that a simple path an orret this matter of fat.A aw has also been identied in the Gnu Classpath, whih is an open soure implemen-tation of the Java lasses. Gnu Classpath is used in onjuntion with the JamVM VirtualMahine and targets resoure-limited devies: the presene of a manifest with a huge size in a loaded Jar le introdues a dramatislowdown of the JVM when the orresponding JarFile Objet is reated, even thoughthe Manifest stays unused.Requirements for programming seure OSGi Systems have been identied. First, a hard-ened version of the OSGi Platform is needed to prevent most of the identied vulnerabilitiesto be exploited. However, sine suh a platform will take time to develop and validate, apragmati approah is to be taken. First, tools should be developed to ease the managementof urrent seurity mehanisms suh as Java Permissions, whih are urrently not adapted todynami systems. Seondly, developers need to keep on mind what the OSGi vulnerabilitiesare: this is made possible by the Seven Deadly Sins of the OSGi R4 Platform.
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 335 ConlusionsThe objetive of our study is to improve the dependability level of the OSGi platform, aswell as the knowledge that is available relative to the vulnerabilities of the OSGi Platform.This improvement is ahieved through four omplementary ontributions. First, we denea method for analyzing the seurity status of software systems, based on a spei SoftwareVulnerability Pattern. Seondly, we provide a vulnerability atalog that identied a set ofvulnerabilities, and the key properties for understanding - and preventing - them. Thirdly,we developed a hardened OSGi Platform, SFelix v0.222, that provides proof of oneptprotetion mehanisms. And we issue a set of reommendations for the OSGi Speiationsthat integrate these protetion mehanisms.Our study is entered on the OSGi Core speiation, and does not take into aountseveral mehanisms that are - or an be - often used together with OSGi platforms. Inpartiular, management failities, suh as JVMTI, and with less impat JMX have notbeen studied. OSGi standard servies are neither been onsidered, and servie engineeringquestions have been negleted. These three elements will require further work, and willlikely enrih our vulnerability atalog.A side-eet ahievement of our study is to preisely identify the requirements in termof researh and development, so as to provide OSGi platform that are atually robust,and not just partially hardened. Stati Code analysis seem to be very promising, but suersfrom signiant theoretial limitation, espeially in the world of Objet-Oriented Languages.Convenient permission management, and proper resoure isolation in Java multi-appliationsystems are also a strong need on the road toward OSGi seurity.The present study provides a pragmati approah to software seurity onerns, targetedat the world of OSGi Platforms. It present an important step toward a better understandingof OSGi-related seurity, and help pratitioners implement safer system by providing ahardened OSGi prototype, SFelix v0.2. An important researh eort is still required toprovide an OSGi platform whih seurity mehanisms an be said to be omplete.
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 37A The OSGi platformThe OSGi Platform23 [OSG05℄ is a omponentization layer to the Java Virtual Mahine. Itsupports the runtime extension of Java-based appliation through a modular approah: theappliations are parted into `bundles', that an be loaded, installed and managed indepen-dently from eah other.In this setion, we present rst an overview of the OSGi Platform, then the ore oneptof OSGi: the bundles and their Life Cyle, and the possible interations between bundles.A.1 OverviewThe OSGi Platform has been developed so as to support extensible Java-based systems inresoure-onstraint systems, suh as automotive and mobile environments. It has sine thenspread into the world of Integrated Development Appliations (in partiular with Elipse),and into appliative servers (IBM Websphere 6.1, Harmony, Cooon, Diretory...).It runs as an overlay to the Java Virtual Mahine (JVM). The gure 13 shows theoverview of an OSGi-based system, with the Operating System (OS), the JVM, the platformitself, and the bundles it ontains.
Figure 13: Overview of an OSGi PlatformThree main onepts sustain the OSGi platform: the platform, the bundle, and theinteroperability between the bundles. The Platform manages the appliations. The bundlesare the unit of deployment and exeution. The interoperability between the bundles isahieved at the lass level (aess to pakages from other bundles) and at the servie level(aess to servies registered by other bundles).A.2 The BundlesAn OSGi bundle is a Jar le [Sun03℄ whih is enhaned by spei meta-data. The typi-al struture of a bundle is shown in the gure 14. The META-INF/MANIFEST.MF leontains the neessary OSGi meta-data: the bundle referene name (the `symboli name'),its version, the dependenies and the provided resoures. Some pakages are exported, i.e.23http://www.osgi.org/
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essible from other bundles inside the platform. The ativator is used by the platform asan initial bootstrap when the bundle is started. Pakages an be exported. Servies an beregistered, so as to be available for other bundles.
Figure 14: Intern Struture of an OSGi bundleEah bundle has a restrited view on the OSGi platform: the OSGi Context, whih istransmitted to the bundle ativator at start time. This ontext referene is needed to publishand look-up for servies. It also supports the aess to the management funtionalities ofthe platform.The OSGi bundles an also aess the Operating System of the mahine it is running onthrough native libraries. This possibility is not spei to the OSGi environment, sine itrelies on the Java Runtime API, but it allows the bundles to break their isolation.The Life Cyle of a bundle inside the OSGi Platform is dened as follows. The bundlemust rst be installed. When it is required to start, the pakage-level dependenies withother bundles are resolved. When all dependenies are resolved, the bundle ativator islaunhed: the start() method is alled, and the related ode is exeuted. Typially, theseoperations onsist in onguration and publiation of servies. The bundle is then in the`started' state. Updating, stopping and uninstalling build the last possible operations forbundle management The gure 15 shows the Life Cyle of a bundle inside a OSGi Platform.A.3 Interations between BundlesThe interations between the bundles are done through two omplementary mehanisms:the pakage export/import and the servie registration lookup faility. These mehanismsare shown in the gure 16.The publiation and lookup of servies are performed through the BundleContext refer-ene that eah bundle reeives ar startup time. During the publiation proess, the adver-tising bundles registers a servie by publishing a Java interfae it is implementing, and byproviding a lass implementing this interfae. The lookup is performed by the lient bundle,whih gets the servie from the BundleContext and uses it as a standard Java objet.
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Figure 15: Life Cyle of an OSGi Bundles inside the platform
Figure 16: Interation Mehanisms between the OSGi BundlesB Vulnerabilities ListThe most ommon Vulnerability Lists presented in the setion 2.2 are given here.B.1 The Lindqvist ClassiationThe omputer seurity intrusions identied by Lindqvist [LJ97℄ are the following: external misuse (not tehnial), hardware misuse, masquerading, setting up subsequent misuse, bypassing intended ontrols,RR n° 6231
40 Parrend & Frénot ative misuse of resoure, passive misuse of resoure, misuse resulting from ination, use of an indiret aid in ommitting other misuse.B.2 Common Weaknesses Enumeration (CWE)The ategories dened in the Common Weaknesses Enumeration [MCJ05℄ are the following: Buer overows, format strings, et. [BUFF℄; Struture and Validity Problems;[SVM℄; Speial Elements [SPEC℄; Common Speial Element Manipulations[SPECM℄; Tehnology-Spei Speial Elements[SPECTS℄; Pathname Traversal and Equivalene Errors [PATH℄; Channel and Path Errors [CP℄; Information Management Errors [INFO℄; Rae Conditions [RACE℄; Permissions, Privileges, and ACLs [PPA℄; Handler Errors [HAND℄; User Interfae Errors [UI℄; Interation Errors [INT℄; Initialization and Cleanup Errors [INIT℄; Resoure Management Errors [RES℄; Numeri Errors [NUM℄; Authentiation Error [AUTHENT℄; Cryptographi errors [CRYPTO℄; Randomness and Preditability [RAND℄; Code Evaluation and Injetion [CODE℄; Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes [ERS℄; Insuient Veriation of Data [VER℄; Modiation of Assumed-Immutable Data [MAID℄; Produt-Embedded Maliious Code [MAL℄; Common Attak Mitigation Failures [ATTMIT℄; Containment errors (ontainer errors) [CONT℄; Misellaneous WIFFs [MISC℄.B.3 Nineteen Dealy SinsThe 19 Deadly Sins dened by Howard [HLV05℄ are the following: buer overows, ommand injetion,
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ripting (XSS), format string problems, integer range error, SQL injetion, trusting network address information, failing to protet network tra, failing to store and protet data, failing to use ryptographially strong random numbers, improper le aess, improper use of SSL, use of weak password-based systems, unauthentiated key exhange, signal rae ondition, use of 'magi' URLs and hidden forms, failure to handle errors, poor usability, information leakage.B.4 OWASP Top TenThe OWASP Top Ten Vulnerability list for 2007 is the following24: Cross Site Sripting (XSS) Injetion Flaws Maliious File Exeution Inseure Diret Objet Referene Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling Broken Authentiation and Session Management Inseure Cryptographi Storage Inseure Communiations Failure to Restrit URL AessB.5 Seven KingdomsThe Seven Kingdoms dened by Gary MGraw [MG06℄ are the following. Note that eahKingdom ontains a ertain number of Phyla, that help give more preise hints so as theatual vulnerabilities. Input Validation and representation, API abuse, Seurity Features,24http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-WIKI-FORMAT-TESTRR n° 6231
42 Parrend & Frénot Time and state, error handling, ode quality, enapsulation + environment
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 43C Formal Expression of the Vulnerability PatternThis setion presents the Vulnerability Pattern in the Augmented Bakus Naur Form (BNF)[CO05℄.The urrent grammar is not meant to be losed: it reets the knowledge relative tothe onsidered vulnerabilities at a given time. It an be extended with additional attributevalues.The atalog of the OSGi Maliious Bundles is referred as the `mb' atalog.Vulnerability Referene VULNERABILITY_NAME ::= text IDENTIFIER ::= CATALOG_ID.SRC_REF.IDwith:CATALOG_ID ::= mbSRC_REF ::= arhive|java|native|osgiID ::= (0-9)* ORIGIN ::= text LOCATION ::= Bundle ( Arhive | Manifest | Ativator | Fragment ) | AppliationCode - ( Native Code | Java ( Code | API ) | OSGi API ) SOURCE ::= (ENTITY ( FUNCTIONNALITY | FLAW ;)+;)+with ENTITY ::= OS | JVM - ( Runtime API | APIs )| OSGi Platform - (( Module |Life-Cyle | Servie ) Layer | Bundle Repository Client )| Appliation CodeFUNCTIONNALITY ::= Kill utility | Value of Method Parameters | ( System.exit| Runtime.halt ) method | Native Code Exeution | Thread API | Reetion API |ClassLoader API | File API | Java Arhive | Bundle Management | Bundle Fragmentsand:FLAW ::= No Algorithm Safety - ( Java | Native Code )| Non OSGi R4-ompliantDigital Signature Validation in the JVM | No Veriation of Bundle Arhive Validity| No Chek of Size of Loaded Bundles | No Chek of Size of stored Data | No safeBundle Start | No Removal of Uninstalled Bundle Data | Bundle Meta-data Handling- No Safe-Default | Unontrolled Servie Registration | Arhiteture of the Appliation- No Validation of Servie Dependeny TARGET ::= Platform | OSGi Element - ( Platform Management Utility | Bundle |Servie|Pakage ) CONSEQUENCE_TYPE ::= ( Unavailability | Performane Breakdown | Undue A-ess )( - ( Platform | Servie | Pakage )(, ( Platform | Servie | Pakage ))*)? INTRODUCTION_TIME ::= Platform Design or Implementation | Development |Bundle Meta-data Generation | Bundle Digital Signature | Installation | Servie Pub-liation or Resolution EXPLOIT_TIME ::= Download | Installation | Bundle Start | ExeutionVulnerability DesriptionRR n° 6231
44 Parrend & Frénot DESCRIPTION ::= text PRECONDITIONS ::= text ATTACK_PROCESS ::= text CONSEQUENCE_DESCRIPTION ::= text SEE_ALSO ::= VULNERABILITY_NAME (, VULNERABILITY_NAME)*Vulnerability Implementation CODE_REFERENCE ::= FILE_NAMEwith FILE_NAME the name of a le, as dened by Unix File Names OSGI_PROFILE ::= CDC-1.0/Foundation-1.0 | OSGi/Minimum-1.1 | JRE-1.1 | J2SE-1.2 | J2SE-1.3 | J2SE-1.4 | J2SE-1.5 | J2SE-1.6 | PersonalJava-1.1 | PersonalJava-1.2 |CDC-1.0/PersonalBasis-1.0 | CDC-1.0/PersonalJava-1.0 DATE ::= MONTH.DAY.YEARwith MONTH ::= (1-12), DAY ::= (1-31), YEAR ::= (0-3000) TEST_COVERAGE ::= (0-100) % TESTED_ON ::= Osar | Felix | Knopersh | EquinoxProtetion EXISTING_MECHANISMS ::= Java Permissions | OSGi AdminPermission | SFelixOSGi Seurity Layer | - ENFORCEMENT_POINT ::= Platform startup | Bundle Installation | - POTENTIAL_MECHANISMS ::= (POTENTIAL_MECHANISM_NAME (POTEN-TIAL_MECHANISM_DESCR)?)+ with POTENTIAL_MECHANISM_NAME ::=Code stati Analysis | OSGi Platform Modiation - ( Bundle Startup Proess | Instal-lation Meta-data Handling | Servie Publiation )| Bundle size ontrol before down-load | Servie-level dependeny validation | Resoure Control and Isolation - ( CPU |Memory | Disk Spae )| Aess Control - FileSystem | Misellaneous | - and POTEN-TIAL_MECHANISM_DESCR ::= text ATTACK_PREVENTION ::= Stop a ill-behaving thread | - REACTION ::= Uninstall the maliious bundle | Erase les | Stop the system proess| Restart the platform | -
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 45D Vulnerability CatalogD.1 Bundle ArhiveD.1.1 Invalid Digital Signature ValidationVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Invalid Digital Signature Validation Identier: Mb.arhive.1 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Arhive Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (Non OSGi R4-ompliant Digital SignatureValidation in the JVM) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Bundle Digital Signature Exploit Time: InstallationVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle whih signature is NOT ompliant to the OSGi R4 DigitalSignature is installed on the platform Preonditions: No Digital Signature Validation, or Digital Signature Validation Pro-ess that relies on the Java JarFile API to perform the validation of the digital signa-ture. The bundle signature must be non OSGi R4 ompliant in one of the followingways: resoures have been removed from the arhive; resoures have been added; therst resoures in the arhive are NOT the Manifest File, the Signature File and theSignature Blok le in this order (see [PF06℄). Attak Proess: Install a bundle with an invalid digital signature (see preonditions) Consequene Desription: - See Also: -Protetion Existing Mehanisms: SFelix OSGi Seurity Layer Enforement Point: Bundle Installation Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: Uninstall the maliious bundleVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Bindex-resoureRemoved-1.0.jar, bindex-resouresAdded-1.0.jar,bindex-unvalidResoureOrder-1.0.jarRR n° 6231
46 Parrend & Frénot OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-04-25 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 47D.1.2 Big Component InstallerVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Big Component Installer Identier: Mb.arhive.2 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Arhive Soure: OSGi Platform - Bundle Repository Client (No Chek of Size of LoadedBundles) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Platform Design or Implementation Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: Remote installation of a bundle whih size is of similar to the availabledevie memory Preonditions: OSGi platform running on a memory limited devie Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: Little memory is available for subsequent operations See Also: Big File CreatorProtetion Existing Mehanisms: OSGi AdminPermission Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Bundle size ontrol before download Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: - OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-20 Test Coverage: 00%
RR n° 6231
48 Parrend & FrénotD.1.3 Deompression BombVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Deompression Bomb Identier: Mb.arhive.3 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Arhive Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No Veriation of Bundle Arhive Valid-ity) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: The Bundle Arhive is a deompression Bomb (either a huge le madeof idential bytes, or a reursive arhive) Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Provide a Bundle Arhive that is a deompression Bomb for instal-lation (on a OBR, et.) Consequene Desription: Important onsumption of CPU or memory. See Also: -Protetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess(Chek that the Bundle is not a Deompression Bomb arhive) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.deompressionbomb-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-04-20 Test Coverage: 50%
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 49D.2 Bundle ManifestD.2.1 Dupliate Pakage ImportVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Dupliate Pakage Import Identier: Mb.osgi.1 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Manifest Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Meta-data Handling - No Safe-Default) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Bundle Meta-data Generation Exploit Time: InstallationVulnerability Desription Desription: A pakage is imported twie (or more) aording to manifest attribute'Import-Pakage'. In the Felix and Knopersh OSGi implementations, the bundlean not be installed Preonditions: - Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: - See Also: Exessive Size of Manifest File, Unvalid Ativator Meta-data, Erroneousvalues of Manifest attributes, Insuient User Meta-dataProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Installation Meta-data Han-dling (ignore the repeated imports during OSGi metadata analysis) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.dupliateimport-0.1.ja OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-10-28 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Knopersh Known Robust Platforms: Equinox; Conierge; SFelix
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50 Parrend & FrénotD.2.2 Exessive Size of Manifest FileVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Exessive Size of Manifest File Identier: Mb.osgi.2 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Manifest Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Meta-data Handling - No Safe-Default) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Bundle Meta-data Generation Exploit Time: InstallationVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle with a huge number of (similar) pakage imports (more than1 Mbyte) Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Insert a big number of imports in the manifest le of the bundle Consequene Desription: In the Felix and Knopersh implementations, thelaunher proess takes a long time (several minutes) to parse the metadata le See Also: Dupliate Pakage Import, Unvalid Ativator Meta-data, Erroneous valuesof Manifest attributes, Insuient User Meta-dataProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Installation Meta-data Han-dling (hek the size of manifest before the installation; more generally, hek theformat of the manifest size before the installation) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.hugemanifest-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-10-28 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Knopersh; Conierge Known Robust Platforms: SFelix; Equinox
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 51D.2.3 Erroneous values of Manifest attributesVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Erroneous values of Manifest attributes Identier: Mb.osgi.3 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Manifest Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Meta-data Handling - No Safe-Default) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Bundle Meta-data Generation Exploit Time: InstallationVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that provides false meta-data, in this example an non existentbundle update loation Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Set a false value for a given meta-data entry Consequene Desription: The ations that rely on the meta-data an not beexeuted (here, no update possible) See Also: Dupliate Import, Exessive Size of Manifest FileProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Installation Meta-data Han-dling (hek the format of the manifest size before the installation, and provide failsafedefault) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.malformedupdateloation-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-10-28 Test Coverage: 10% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
RR n° 6231
52 Parrend & FrénotD.3 Bundle AtivatorD.3.1 Management Utility Freezing - Innite LoopVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop Extends: Innite Loop in Method Call Identier: Mb.osgi.4 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Ativator Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No safe Bundle Start) Target: OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown; Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: Bundle StartVulnerability Desription Desription: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator Preonditions: - Attak Proess: An innite loop is exeuted in the Bundle Ativator Consequene Desription: Blok the OSGi Management entity (the felix, equinoxor knopersh shell; when launhed in the KF graphial interfae, the shell remainavailable but the GUI is frozen). Beause of the innite loop, most CPU resoure isonsumed See Also: CPU Load Injetion, Innite Loop in Method Call, Stand Alone InniteLoop, Hanging ThreadProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -CPU ; OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess (launh the bundle a-tivator in a separate thread to prevent startup hanging) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.inniteloopinmethodall-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-24
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 53 Test Coverage: 10% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
RR n° 6231
54 Parrend & FrénotD.3.2 Management Utility Freezing - Thread HangingVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Management Utility Freezing - Thread Hanging Extends: Hanging Thread Identier: Mb.osgi.5 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Ativator Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No safe Bundle Start) Target: OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: Bundle StartVulnerability Desription Desription: A hanging thread in the Bundle Ativator makes the managementutility freeze Preonditions: - Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: Blok the OSGi Management entity (the felix, equinoxor knopersh shell; when launhed in the KF graphial interfae, the shell remainavailable but the GUI is frozen). See Also: Management Utility Freezing - Innite Loop, Hanging ThreadProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Startup Proess(launh the bundle ativator in a separate thread); Code stati Analysis Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.hangingthread-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.hangingthread2-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-24 Test Coverage: 20% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 55D.4 Bundle Code - NativeD.4.1 Runtime.exe.killVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Runtime.exe.kill Identier: Mb.native.1 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Native Code Soure: OS (Kill utility); JVM - Runtime API (Native Code Exeution) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that stops the exeution platform through an OS all Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or FilePermission `exeute' on the requiredutilities (kill, ps, grep, ut) Attak Proess: Kill the OS proess whih orresponds to the exeution platform;this proess is identied as far it is the parent proess of the proess in whih themaliious sript is exeuted Consequene Desription: The shutdown hooks of the platforms arer exeuted See Also: System.exit, Runtime.halt, Reursive Thread CreationProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis Attak Prevention: - Reation: Restart the platformVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.runtime_exe_kill-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-21 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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56 Parrend & FrénotD.4.2 CPU Load InjetionVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: CPU Load Injetion Identier: Mb.native.2 Origin: MOSGI, Ares researh projet Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Native Code Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Native Code); JVM - Runtime API(Native Code Exeution) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A maliious bundle that onsumes 80% of the host CPU Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or RuntimePermission `loadLibrary' Attak Proess: Exeute a C all that onsume CPU by swithing between CPU-intensive alulation and sleep time, aording to the speied ratio Consequene Desription: Most of the available CPU of the system is onsumedartiially See Also: Memory Load Injetion, Ramping Memory Load Injetion, Innite Loop,Stand-alone Innite LoopProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: Misellaneous (extension of the Java-Level seurity meha-nisms to the native ode) Attak Prevention: - Reation: Uninstall the maliious bundleVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.puloadinjetor-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-24 Test Coverage: 00% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 57D.5 Bundle Code - JavaD.5.1 System.exitVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: System.exit Identier: Mb.java.1 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - Runtime API (System.exit method) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that stops the platform by alling 'System.exit(0)' Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or presene of the RuntimePermission `exitVM' Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: - See Also: Runtime.halt, Exe.Kill, Reursive Thread CreationProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis Attak Prevention: - Reation: Restart the platformVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.system_exit-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-11 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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58 Parrend & FrénotD.5.2 Runtime.haltVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Runtime.halt Identier: Mb.java.2 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - Runtime API (Runtime.halt method) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that stops the platform by alling 'Runtime.getRuntime.halt(0)' Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or RuntimePermission `exitVM' Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: The shutdown hooks are by-passed See Also: System.exit, Exe.Kill, Reursive Thread CreationProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis Attak Prevention: - Reation: Restart the platformVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.runtime_halt-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-11 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 59D.5.3 Reursive Thread CreationVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Reursive Thread Creation Identier: Mb.java.3 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (Thread API); Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: The exeution platform is brought to rash by the reation of an expo-nential number of threads Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Eah thread reated by the attak bundle reates three otherthreads, and ontains a relatively small payload (a pdf le). An exessive numberof StakOverowErrors auses an OutOfMemoryError Consequene Desription: - See Also: System.exit, Runtime.halt, Exe.kill, Exponential Objet CreationProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: Stop the ill-behaving thread Reation: Restart the platformVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.exponentialthreadnumber-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-21 Test Coverage: 50% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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60 Parrend & FrénotD.5.4 Hanging ThreadVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Hanging Thread Identier: Mb.java.4 Origin: Java puzzlers 77, 85 [BG05℄ Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (Thread API); Appliation Code (Value of Method Parameters) Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: Thread that make the alling entity hang (servie, or pakage) Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Use the Thread.sleep all with a large sleep duration to make theexeution hang Consequene Desription: If the sleep all is performed in a synhronized blok,the SIG_KILL (Ctrl+C) signal is aught by the platform See Also: Innite Startup LoopProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.hangingthread-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.hangingthread2-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-28 Test Coverage: 20% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 61D.5.5 Sleeping BundleVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Sleeping Bundle Identier: Mb.java.5 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (Thread API) Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A maliious bundle that goes to sleep during a speied amount of timebefore having nished its job (experiene time is 50 se.) Preonditions: - Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: - See Also: Hanging ThreadProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.sleepingbundle-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-28 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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62 Parrend & FrénotD.5.6 Big File CreatorVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Big File Creator Identier: Mb.java.6 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (File API) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A maliious bundle that reate a big (relative to available resoures)les to onsume disk memory spae Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or FilePermission `write' to the maliious bundl Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: - See Also: Big Bundle InstallerProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: Resoure Control and Isolation - Disk Spae (per user/bundle);Aess Control - FileSystem (Limit the aess to the FileSystem to the data diretoryof the bundle; ontrol the size of the data reated through the BundleContext) Attak Prevention: - Reation: Erase lesVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.biglereator-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-29 Test Coverage: 00% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 63D.5.7 Code ObserverVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Code Observer Identier: Mb.java.7 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (Reetion API; ClassLoader API) Target: OSGi Element - Pakage; OSGi Element - Servie Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A omponent that observes the ontent of another one Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or ReetPermission Attak Proess: Use of the reetion API and the ClassLoader API Consequene Desription: Observation of the implementation of the publishedpakages and servies, the lasses that are aggregated to these pakages and servies,and lasses whih name are known (or guessed) See Also: Component Data Modier, Hidden Method LaunherProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Privatelassspy/fr.inria.ares.servieabuser-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-12 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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64 Parrend & FrénotD.5.8 Component Data ModierVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Component Data Modier Extends: Code Observer Identier: Mb.java.8 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (Reetion API; ClassLoader API) Target: OSGi Element - Pakage; OSGi Element - Servie Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that modies the data (i.e. the value of the attributes of thelasses) of another one Preonditions: No SeurityManager or ReetPermission set; the name of the non-exported modied lass must be known beforehand, and ontain a publi stati eld. Attak Proess: Use of the reetion API and the ClassLoader API to aess andmodify the value of attributes Consequene Desription: Modiation of the publi elds of the objets that areaessible from another bundle (servie implementations, or objets that are attributesof these servie implementations, or objets that are attributes of these latter objets,...), or of the publi stati (non nal) elds of lasses whih name is known See Also: Code Observer, Hidden Method LaunherProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Privatelassmanipulator/fr.inria.ares.servieabuser-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-12 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 65D.5.9 Hidden Method LaunherVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Hidden Method Launher Extends: Code Observer Identier: Mb.java.9 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: JVM - APIs (Reetion API; ClassLoader API) Target: OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that exeutes methods from lasses that are not exportedof provided as servie. All lasses that are referened (diretly or indiretly) as lassattributes an be aessed. Only publi methods an be invoked Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or ReetPermission set Attak Proess: Use of the reetion API and the ClassLoader API to aess andexeutes methods in lasses that are not exported by the bundle Consequene Desription: - See Also: Code Observer, Component Data ModierProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Hiddenlassexeutor/fr.inria.ares.servieabuser-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-12 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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66 Parrend & FrénotD.5.10 Memory Load InjetionVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Memory Load Injetion Identier: Mb.java.10 Origin: MOSGI Ares Researh Projet (OSGi Platform Monitoring) Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java API Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A maliious bundle that onsumes most of available memory (61,65MB in the example) Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Store a huge amount of data in a byte array Consequene Desription: Only a limited memory spae is available for the exe-ution of programs See Also: Ramping Memory Load Injetion, CPU Load InjetionProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -Memory Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.memloadinjetor-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-24 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 67D.5.11 Stand Alone Innite LoopVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Stand Alone Innite Loop Identier: Mb.java.11 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java Code Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A void loop in a lonesome thread that onsumes muh of the availableCPU Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Innite loop launhed in an independent thread Consequene Desription: - See Also: Innite Startup Loop, CPU Load InjetionProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -CPU Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.standaloneloop-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-09-22 Test Coverage: 10% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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68 Parrend & FrénotD.5.12 Innite Loop in Method CallVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Innite Loop in Method Call Identier: Mb.java.12 Origin: Java puzzlers 26 to 33 [BG05℄ Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java Code Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java) Target: Platform; OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown - Platform; Unavailability - Servie,Pakage Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: An innite loop is exeuted in a method all (at lass use, pakage use) Preonditions: - Attak Proess: An innite loop is exeuted in a method all Consequene Desription: Blok the alling entity (the alling lass or servie.Beause of the innite loop, most CPU resoure is onsumed See Also: CPU Load Injetion, Stand-alone Innite Loop, Hanging ThreadProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -CPU Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.inniteloopinmethodall-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-08-24 Test Coverage: 10% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 69D.5.13 Exponential Objet CreationVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Exponential Objet Creation Identier: Mb.java.13 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - Java Code Soure: Appliation Code (No Algorithm Safety - Java) Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: Objets are reated in a exponential way Preonditions: - Attak Proess: A given objet reate in its onstrutor 3 instanes of objet of thesame lass Consequene Desription: The method all aborts with a 'StakOverowError' See Also: Reursive Thread CreationProtetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Code stati Analysis ; Resoure Control and Isolation -Memory Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.exponentialobjetreation-0.1 OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-01-09 Test Coverage: 50% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
RR n° 6231
70 Parrend & FrénotD.6 Bundle Code - OSGi APiD.6.1 Launh a Hidden BundleVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Launh a Hidden Bundle Identier: Mb.osgi.6 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (Bundle Management); JVM - APIs (FileAPI) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that launhes another bundle it ontains (the ontained bun-dle ould be masqued as with a 'MyFile.java' le name) Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi PermissionAdmin and FilePermission`write' for the maliious bundle Attak Proess: A bundle reates a new bundle on the le system, and launhes i Consequene Desription: A non foreseen bundle is installed. If install time hek-ing exists (suh as digital signature), it passes through the veriation proess See Also: Pirat Bundle ManagerProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: Uninstall the maliious bundleVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.silentloader-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.silentloader.onierge-0.1.jar (without swing) OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-10-28 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 71D.6.2 Pirat Bundle ManagerVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Pirat Bundle Manager Identier: Mb.osgi.7 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (Bundle Management) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A bundle that manages others without being requested to do so(here:stops and starts the vitim bundle) Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi Permission Admin Attak Proess: The pirat bundle aesses to the bundle ontext, and then to itsvitim bundle Consequene Desription: - See Also: Launh Hidden BundleProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.piratbundlemanager-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.piratbundlemanager.onierge-0.1.jar (no swing) OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-10-30 Test Coverage: 40% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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72 Parrend & FrénotD.6.3 Zombie DataVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Zombie Data Identier: Mb.osgi.8 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API Soure: OSGi Platform - Life-Cyle Layer (No Removal of Uninstalled Bundle Data) Target: Platform Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: Data stored in the loal OSGi data store are not deleted when therelated bundle is uninstalled. It thus beomes unavailable and onsumes disks spae(espeially on resoure onstraint devies) Preonditions: No SeuriyManager, or FilePermission set Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: - See Also: Big File CreatorProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Bundle Uninstall Proess(Delete Bundle Data when Bundles are uninstalled) Attak Prevention: - Reation: Erase lesVulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.biglereator-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-04-20 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Conierge Known Robust Platforms: Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 73D.6.4 Cyle Between ServiesVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Cyle Between Servies Identier: Mb.osgi.9 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API Soure: OSGi Platform - Servie Layer (Arhiteture of the Appliation - No Valida-tion of Servie Dependeny) Target: OSGi Element - Servie; OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Unavailability Introdution Time: Servie Publiation or Resolution Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A yle exists in the servies all Preonditions: - Attak Proess: Servie 1 alls servie 2, whih alls servie 1. The attak an beimplemented as a fake 'servie 2', whih alls servie 1 bak instead of return properlyfrom the method that servie 1 alled Consequene Desription: `java.lang.StakOverowError', servie 1 an not beexeuted See Also: -Protetion Existing Mehanisms: - Enforement Point: - Potential Mehanisms: Servie-level dependeny validation Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.lientserver1-0.1.jar, fr.inria.ares.lientserver2-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2006-10-28 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge; SFelix
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74 Parrend & FrénotD.6.5 Numerous Servie RegistrationVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Numerous Servie Registration Identier: Mb.osgi.10 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API Soure: OSGi Platform - Servie Layer (Unontrolled Servie Registration) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle; OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: Registration of a high number of (possibly idential) servies throughan loop Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi ServiePermission Attak Proess: Publish a given servie in a(n) (e.g. innite) loop Consequene Desription: Important duration of bundle stop See Also: -Protetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Servie Publiation (limita-tion of the number of servies published in the framework) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.numerousservies-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-01-09 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; Conierge Known Robust Platforms: SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 75D.6.6 Freezing Numerous Servie RegistrationVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Freezing Numerous Servie Registration Identier: Mb.osgi.11 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Appliation Code - OSGi API Soure: OSGi Platform - Servie Layer (Unontrolled Servie Registration) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle; OSGi Element - Platform Management Utility Consequene Type: Performane Breakdown Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: Registration of a high number of (possibly idential) servies throughan loop, in the Conierge OSGi Platform implementation Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or OSGi ServiePermission; exeution in theConierge OSGi Platform Attak Proess: Publish a given servie in a(n) (e.g. innite) loop Consequene Desription: The Platform almost totally freeze. OutOfMemory-Errors are reported very frequently when the shell is used or when bundles performations. See Also: -Protetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: OSGi Platform Modiation - Servie Publiation (limita-tion of the number of servies published in the framework) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fr.inria.ares.numerousservies-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-04-20 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Conierge
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76 Parrend & FrénotD.7 Bundle FragmentsD.7.1 Exeute Hidden ClassesVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Exeute Hidden Classes Identier: Mb.osgi.12 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Fragment Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Fragments) Target: OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A fragment bundle exports a pkage that is not made visible by thehost. Other bundles an then exeute the lasses in this pakage Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or BundlePermission, `HOST' set to the host,and BundlePermission, `FRAGMENT', set to the maliious fragment Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: Modiation of stati attributes, publiation of hiddendata or exeution of seret proedure; Conierge does not support fragment, and doestherefore not ontains this vulnerability See Also: Fragment Substitution, Aess Proteted Pakage through split PakagesProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Usehiddenlass/pakageexportfragment.jar+ usehiddenlass/fr.inria.ares.fragmentaomplie-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-14 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 77D.7.2 Fragment SubstitutionVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Fragment Substitution Identier: Mb.osgi.13 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Fragment Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Fragments) Target: OSGi Element - Bundle Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A spei fragment bundle is replae by another, whih provides thesame lasses but with maliious implementation Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or BundlePermission `HOST' and `FRAG-MENT' set to the required bundles, and OSGi AdminPermission set to the substitutorbundle Attak Proess: A maliious bundles uninstalls the urrent fragment, and install amaliious one (that is embedded in it) instead Consequene Desription: The host bundle exeutes a false implementations oflasses provided by a fragment; Conierge does not support fragment, and does there-fore not ontains this vulnerability See Also: Launh Hidden Bundle, Pirat Bundle Manager, Exeute Hidden Class,Aess Proteted Pakage through split PakagesProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: - Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fragmentprovidespakagestohost/fr.inria.ares.fragmentsubstitutor(has an embedded fragmentprovidespakagestohost/testfragmentlone bundle) OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-16 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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78 Parrend & FrénotD.7.3 Aess Proteted Pakage through split PakagesVulnerability Referene Vulnerability Name: Aess Proteted Pakage through split Pakages Identier: Mb.osgi.14 Origin: Ares researh projet `maliious-bundle' Loation of Exploit Code: Bundle Fragment Soure: OSGi Platform - Module Layer (Bundle Fragments) Target: OSGi Element - Pakage Consequene Type: Undue Aess Introdution Time: Development Exploit Time: ExeutionVulnerability Desription Desription: A pakage is built in the fragment, that have the same name than apakage in the host. All pakage-proteted lasses and methods an then be aessedfrom the fragment, and through a proxy exported in the framework Preonditions: No SeurityManager, or BundlePermission `HOST' and `FRAG-MENT' set to the suitable bundles Attak Proess: - Consequene Desription: Conierge does not support fragment, and does there-fore not ontains this vulnerability See Also: Exeute Hidden Class, Fragment SubstitutionProtetion Existing Mehanisms: Java Permissions Enforement Point: Platform startup Potential Mehanisms: Misellaneous (the Java Arhive dened 'seal' keyword inthe Manifest File does not prevent the pakage to be ompleted by a split pakage inthe fragment. It probably should) Attak Prevention: - Reation: -Vulnerability Implementation Code Referene: Fragmentsplitpakage/fr.inria.ares.testhostbundle-0.1.jar +fragmentsplitpakage/testfragment-0.1.jar +fragmentsplitpakage/fr.inria.ares.fragmentlient-0.1.jar OSGi Prole: J2SE-1.5 Date: 2007-02-17 Test Coverage: 100% Known Vulnerable Platforms: Felix; Equinox; Knopersh; SFelix
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OSGi Vulnerabilities 79E Attak ImplementationsThe implementations of the presented attaks are given. Two types of attaks an be per-formed through several dierent implementations.E.1 Innite LoopsThe various implementations of Innites Loops in Java are given. They math the Vulner-ability mb.java.8 and mb.java.12 in our atalog.E.1.1 First Optionboolean ondition==true;While(ondition);E.1.2 Seond OptionThis implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #26 [BG05℄.publi stati final int END = Integer.MAX\_VALUE;publi stati final int START = END - 100; // or any other start valuefor (int i = START; i <= END; i++);E.1.3 Third OptionThis implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #27 [BG05℄.int i = 0;while (-1 << i != 0){i++;}E.1.4 Fourth OptionThis implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #28 [BG05℄.
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80 Parrend & Frénotdouble i = 1.0/0.0; //an also be set to Double.POSITIVE\_INFINITY,//or a suffiiently big number (suh as 1.0e17 or bigger)while (i == i + 1);E.1.5 Fifth OptionThis implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #45 [BG05℄.publi stati void main(String[℄ args) {workHard();}private stati void workHard() {try {workHard();} finally {workHard();}}E.1.6 Other ImplementationsFor further implementation of the innite loop, you an also refer to the Java Puzzler #29 (double i = Double.NaN;while(i! =i);), the Java Puzzler #30 (String i = a; while (i != i + 0)), puzzler 31 ( short i = -1;while (i != 0) i >= 1;), the Java Puzzler #32 (Integer i = new Integer(0); Integer j = new Integer(0); while (i<= j && j <= i && i != j);), the Java Puzzler #33 (int i = Integer.MIN_VALUE; while (i != 0 && i == -i);(//orlong i = Long.MIN_VALUE), for() loop with unsuitable modiation of the variablesthat intervene in the stop ondition).E.2 Hanging ThreadThe various implementations of Hanging Threads in Java are given. They math the Vul-nerability mb.java.9 in our atalog.
INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 81E.2.1 First OptionThis implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #77 [BG05℄.
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82 Parrend & Frénotimport java.util.Timer;import java.util.TimerTask;publi lass Stopper extends Thread{private volatile boolean quittingTime = false;publi void run() {while (!quittingTime)pretendToWork();System.out.println(``Beer is good'');}private void pretendToWork() {try {Thread.sleep(300); // Sleeping on the job?} ath (InterruptedExeption ex) { }}// It's quitting time, wait for worker - Called by good bosssynhronized void quit() throws InterruptedExeption {quittingTime = true;join();}// Resind quitting time - Called by evil bosssynhronized void keepWorking() {quittingTime = false;} publi void hang(){System.out.println(``HangingThread Stopper ready''+``to behave badly'');try{ final Stopper worker = new Stopper();worker.start();Timer t = new Timer(true); // Daemon threadt.shedule(new TimerTask() {publi void run() { worker.keepWorking(); }}, 500);Thread.sleep(400);worker.quit();}ath( InterruptedExeption e){ e.printStakTrae();}}} INRIA
OSGi Vulnerabilities 83E.2.2 Seond OptionThis implementation is given in the Java Puzzler #85 [BG05℄.stati {Thread t = new Thread(new Runnable() {publi void run() {initialized = true;}});t.start();try {t.join();} ath(InterruptedExeption e) {throw new AssertionError(e);}}E.2.3 Other ImplementationsFor other implementations, see the JLint Manual25 for `deadlok errors' (2 ourrenes).
25http://artho.om/jlint/manual.htmlRR n° 6231
84 Parrend & FrénotF XML2Tex Doumentation GeneratorTo ease the validation of the Vulnerability Patterns and the generation of the atalog, wedeveloped a small tool based on XML tehnologies, XML2Tex. The overall proess of theXML2tex Doumentation Generation proess is given in Figure 17.Figure 17 presents the overview of the XML2tex Doumentation Generation proess.
Figure 17: XML2Tex ProessFirst, the vulnerability pattern is heked against a referene XML Shema (XSD). Se-ondly, its is transformed into an XML report through XSL transformations. An XML Reportis a spei XML le whih is easily mappable to doumentation: its ontains in partiular atitle, paragraphs, and so on. Thirdly, the XML report is transformed into a Tex le throughan Ad-Ho parser named Report2Tex.The validity of the Vulnerability Patterns of the atalog is guaranteed by their validationagainst the formal expression of the Pattern given in the appendix C. The well-formednessof the XML Report and of the Tex le are ensures by the suessive parsers.
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